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Abstract:  The award of the Nobel Prize in Economics to Professor Jean Tirole in 2014 has 
generated intense interest about his brainchild theory of two-sided markets.  Against this 
background, this paper explores whether there is such a thing as a unified theory of two-sided 
markets and whether the two-sided markets literature can readily be applied by antitrust 
agencies, regulatory authorities and courts.  This paper vindicates caution.  The buzz 
surrounding two-sided markets could mask the fact that, in many cases, the policy implications 
of the theory are not yet clear, and that divergences among its proponents are often 
underplayed.  In that regard, the paper notably stresses that one of the key conditions of market 
two-sidedness identified by Rochet and Tirole in their seminal paper of 2003 – the 
unavailability of Coasian bargaining between both sides of a platform – has often disappeared 
from subsequent scholarship.  This omission threatens the coherent implementation of the 
theory of two-sided markets.  Without this qualification, markets are often mischaracterized as 
two-sided, as soon as they display prima facie signs of indirect network externalities. 
KEY WORDS: antitrust, competition law, two-sided markets, Coase theorem, payment platforms, 
Microsoft, e-books 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper discusses the two-sided markets theory in an antitrust context.  At its core, the theory 
finds that in markets where platforms interact with distinct groups of users, total output is 
influenced by the allocation of prices between the various groups.  This finding marks a 
departure from the Structure-Conduct-Performance (“SCP”) paradigm which has informed 
decades of applied antitrust policy across the world.1  
Today, the theory of two-sided markets is one of the most widely discussed topics in modern 
industrial organization (“IO”) scholarship.  Hundreds of academic papers have been written 
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about it in the last ten years2.  And several of those papers have entered the antitrust literature, 
insisting on the potential of the two-sided markets theory to inform antitrust policy and 
regulation.3  Whilst scholars are still divided as to the relevance of the theory across all areas 
of antitrust policy, most tend to agree on its inherent contribution to the enforcement of antitrust 
law, in particular in the digital economy.4 
Conceivably, this novel field of academic work will sooner or later filter through practice.  The 
economics-driven nature of the antitrust process is favorable to the importation of IO 
developments in real life cases.  As Kimble v Marvel Entertainement LLC recalled, the US 
Supreme Court “has felt free to revise [its] legal analysis as economic understanding evolves 
and to reverse antitrust precedents that misperceived a practice’s competitive consequences”.5  
At one point or the other, stakeholders – economic consultants, lawyers, lobbyists and 
governments – will invite antitrust agencies, courts and regulators to pass judgment on two-
sided markets arguments.  In a more distant future, agencies and regulators may even attempt 
to derive general policy guidelines from two-sided markets literature.6  Whilst, some scholars 
                                                 
2
 See David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, The Antitrust Analysis of Multi-Sided Platform 
Businesses (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No w18783, 2012).  Evans and 
Schmalensee have counted more than 200 papers on multi-sided platforms. 
 
3
 See, for instance, Bernard Caillaud & Bruno Jullien, Chicken & Egg: Competition among 
Intermediation Service Providers, 34 RAND J. ECON., No. 2, 309, 309-28 (2003).  The authors 
consider that “the design of competition policy rules with respect to such markets should take 
these characteristics into account”. 
 
4
 Some scholars find the theory to be relevant across the board, including in relation to 
exclusionary conduct.  See Schmalensee and Evans, supra note 2.  Others argue that two-sided 
markets theory will mainly grow in importance in relation to pricing issues such as aggressive 
price competition in single firm conduct cases, market definition and the SSNIP test in merger 
control, etc.  See Marc Rysman, The Economics of Two-Sided Markets, 23 J. ECON. 
PERSPECTIVES, No. 3, 125, 125-143 (2009).  Although there are some exceptions, only a few 
papers identify theories of harm specific to two-sided markets.  See Massimo Motta & Helder 
Vasconcelos, Exclusionary Pricing in a Two-sided Market (Centre for Econ. Pol’y Research, 
Discussion Paper No 9164, 2012). 
 
5
 Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 576 U.S. ____ (2015). 
 
6
 See notably a report by the German monopoly commission.  Monopolkommissie, Competition 
policy: The challenge of digital markets (Special Report by the Monopolies Commission 
pursuant to Section 44(1)(4) ARC, 1 June 2015), 
http://www.monopolkommission.de/images/PDF/SG/SG68/S68_summary.pdf (the report sets 
out a number of challenges relating to antitrust enforcement in two-sided markets, which could 
potentially lead to the establishment of more formal guidelines). 
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like Josh Wright and Janusz Ordover have cautioned against a premature policy implementation 
of two-sided markets theory7, their voice remains marginal in the literature. 
Our paper seeks to take a stance in this debate.  Its goal is to identify what the theory of two-
sided markets has to offer to competition agencies, and the challenges they may face when 
trying to apply the theory’s core findings.  
To explore those issues, the paper is structured as follows.  Following this introduction, Section 
II tries to ascertain the place occupied by two-sided markets theory in the industrial organization 
literature (II).  We find that there is, to date, no unified theory of two-sided markets.  On the 
contrary, we document serious conceptual divergences amongst its proponents.  Section III, in 
turn, investigates the place of the two-sided markets theory in modern antitrust policy in the US 
and the EU (III).  We review two types of unilateral and coordinated conduct cases.  We first 
look at cases where the decision-maker explicitly took account of the theory of two-sided 
markets to resolve the case.  We then discuss cases where the theory did not ostensibly influence 
the decision-maker, despite its possible relevance to the main proceedings.  This investigation 
in positive antitrust policy ultimately helps cast light on the added-value that the two-sided 
markets theory brings to practice.  Section IV concludes (IV).  It finds that two-sided markets 
theory has brought a number of practical contributions in applied antitrust policy, even though 
a number of challenges remain.  Some of these challenges would be overcome if a more 
cohesive theory of two-sided markets were developed. 
II. THE THEORY OF TWO-SIDED MARKETS AND ITS PLACE IN THE 
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION LITERATURE 
This section explains that the two-sided markets theory is a refinement of traditional IO theory 
(A).  It then shows that from an operational standpoint, the theory is still in a state of flux, for 
many of its definitions and concepts remain unsettled (B).  Lastly, it suggests that more work 
is needed, if the theory is ever to usher in a unified and mature normative framework (C). 
                                                 
 
7
 See, notably, the statement of Joshua Wright, Commissioner of the FTC. Ron Knox, Wright: 
Guidance on two-sided markets may prove difficult, Global Competition Review, 11 February 
2013, http://globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/33038/wright-guidance-two-sided-
markets-may-prove-difficult/.  See also Janusz Ordover, Comments on Evans & Schmalensee's 
'The Industrial Organization of Markets with Two-Sided Platforms', 3 COMPETITION POL'Y 
INT'L, No. 1, 181, 181-89 (2007), (Ordover argues that there is still much work to be done on 
the topic of two-sided markets).  
 
4 
 
A. EPISTEMOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT 
1. THE CLASSIC DESCRIPTIVE AMBITION OF TWO-SIDED MARKETS THEORY 
The essence of industrial organization is to study the effects of distinct forms of industry 
structure on price and output levels.  Monopoly theory posits that a single supplier will charge 
a higher price than the market demands, causing a deadweight loss as valuable output is not 
produced (allocative inefficiency).  The theory of perfect competition finds that atomistic 
suppliers will serve at the lowest possible price, producing all the requested output (allocative 
efficiency).  Oligopoly theory suggests that when there are only a few suppliers, other factors 
influence price levels, in several possible directions (between the monopoly and the perfect 
competition level). 
These questions were studied by early scholars like Marshall8, Cournot9, Bertrand10, 
Chamberlin11, Mason12 and Robinson13, from the end XIXth century to the mid XXth century14.  
They have also been on the research agenda of Harvard15, Chicago16 and Post-Chicago 
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 See notably ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (1890). 
 
9
 See notably ANTOINE AUGUSTIN COURNOT, RECHERCHES SUR LES PRINCIPES MATHÉMATIQUES 
DE LA THÉORIE DES RICHESSES (1838). 
 
10
 See notably Joseph Louis François Bertrand, Book review of theorie mathematique de la 
richesse sociale and of recherches sur les principles mathematiques de la theorie des richesses, 
67 JOURNAL DE SAVANTS, 499–508 (1883). 
 
11
 EDWARD HASTINGS CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION: A RE-
ORIENTATION OF THE THEORY OF VALUE (1st ed., 1927). 
 
12
 EDWARD S. MASON, THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY (1959). 
 
13
 JOAN ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION (1933). 
 
14
 See T.A.B. Corley, Emergence of the Theory of Industrial Organization, 1890-1990, 19 BUS. 
& ECON. HIST., Papers presented at the thirty-sixth annual meeting of the Business History 
Conference, 83, 83-92, (1990).  
 
15
 See notably JOE S. BAIN, PRICE THEORY (1952).  See Joe S. Bain, Relation of Profit Rate to 
Industry Concentration: American Manufacturing, 1936–1940, 65 Q. J. ECON., No. 3, 293, 293-
324 (1951).  See also PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, DONALD F. TURNER, 
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION (1991). 
 
16
 See notably GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE (4th ed.1987).  See also ROBERT H. 
BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (illustrated reprint 1993) (1978).  See also RICHARD A. 
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (2nd ed., 2001). 
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scholars17 since the second half of the XXth century though with distinct methodologies – 
Harvard scholars used empirical measurements, Chicago scholars favored formal reasoning, 
while many Post-Chicago scholars rely on game theoretic frameworks and focus on the 
organization of industry structure in the broad sense, including in terms of firms’ strategy, 
product characteristics, customer preferences, government interference, etc. 
This is the fundamental level at which the theory of two-sided markets is often said to cut 
through.  Originally, the theory can be traced to three papers by Caillaud and Julien18, Rochet 
and Tirole19, and Armstrong20, published in the years 2003 to 2006.  The best presentation of 
the theory begins with the idea that in some markets, profit-seeking manufacturers who wish to 
remain competitive vie to get two separate groups of users “on board”.  The case of console 
and video games producers is often used as an illustration.  In this market, no developer would 
produce games for a console that has no gamers.  Likewise, no gamer would buy a console if 
there were no compatible games (and thus developers).  According to the theory of two-sided 
markets, a solution to this “chicken and egg” problem is for the console manufacturers to 
“choose a price structure and not only a price level”.21  This decision is not benign in terms of 
output.  In their 2006 paper, Rochet et Tirole find that for a given (total) price level, output can 
increase “by charging more to one side and less to the other relative to what the market 
delivers”22.  One side (gamers) also known as the “money side”23 will be called to cross-
                                                 
 
17
 JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (1988). 
 
18
 Caillaud & Jullien, supra note 3.  
 
19
 Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 1 J. EUR. 
ECON. ASSOCIATION, No. 4, 990, 990-1029 (2003). 
 
20
 Mark Armstrong, Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 37 RAND J. ECON., No. 3, 668, 668-
91 (2006). 
 
21
 Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report, 37 RAND J. 
ECON., No. 3, 645, 648 (2006).  See also Daniel F. Spulber, Solving the Circular Conundrum:  
Communication and Coordination in internet Markets, 104 NW. U. L. REV., No. 2, 537, 537-
592 (2010), (Spulber talks of a “circular conundrum”). 
 
22
 Rochet and Tirole, supra note 21, at 648. 
 
23Console manufacturers typically earn royalties from each game that is sold.  These royalties, 
ultimately paid by gamers, appear to make up the bulk of console manufacturer’s earnings.  See 
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subsidize the participation of the other side (developers), also referred to as the “subsidy side”24.  
In such settings, the “decomposition or allocation” of the total price between the two sides will 
affect output. 
From an epistemological perspective, this is the theory’s central finding.  Allocative efficiency 
can be improved by changes to the price structure, and not only by changes to its level.  But is 
this really revolutionary from a theoretical standpoint? 
Rochet and Tirole themselves cautioned against this reading.  In their 2006 paper, they 
explained that the fact that the price structure affects economic efficiency is a “widespread 
belief” and already a “premise” for many policy interventions.  In reality, Rochet and Tirole did 
not seem to articulate a normative analysis of two-sided markets but instead, as Stigler once 
wrote25, they sought, “to explain economic life” in continuance of the positive tradition of IO 
scholarship  In this context, their seminal 2003 paper primarily pursued a descriptive ambition. 
26
  It explored how platforms in distinct environments allocate prices between the two sides of 
the market.  
Their 2006 paper followed the same descriptive purpose, but pushed it one step further by 
attempting to provide a stylized definition of two-sided markets, and of the necessary conditions 
for their existence.27  In this context, it is now undisputed that there must be indirect network 
externalities (or cross-platform externalities) to have a two-sided market: users’ participation 
on one side increases the participation of users on the other side (and vice versa).  In other 
words, the price structure must be “non neutral”.  In addition – and of equal importance –Rochet 
and Tirole argue that users must be prevented from negotiating away the platform’s price 
                                                 
notably Julia Wood, Teardown of Xbox, PS4 reveal tight margins, CNBC (Nov. 27, 2013, 3.13 
AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/101230904. 
 
24
 A developer kit for Sony’s new PS4 console usually costs as little as $2500 and is sometimes 
given to developers free of charge.  See Colin Campbell, So how much does it cost to develop 
for PlayStation 4?, POLYGON (Jul. 24, 2013), http://www.polygon.com/2013/7/24/4553842/so-
how-much-does-it-cost-to-develop-for-playstation-4. 
 
25
 George J. Stigler, Law or Economics?, 35 J. L. & ECON., No. 2, 455, 463. 
 
26
 Rochet & Tirole, supra note 19. 
 
27
 See Rochet & Tirole, supra note 21, at 648. 
 
7 
 
allocation through Coasian bargaining or thanks to monopoly power.28  As we highlight 
below29, this last limb of the definition has been somewhat ignored in more recent scholarship. 
Importantly, the subsequent IO literature that sought to build on Rochet and Tirole also 
followed a descriptive approach.  For instance, the oft-quoted 2006 Armstrong paper 
underscores three main factors that determine the price structure of a platform: the relative size 
of cross-group externalities, fixed fees or royalties, and presence of single or multi-homing.30  
Armstrong further attempted to explain which side pays more and less in terms of externalities 
(the side that brings the biggest positive externalities to the other pays less). 
2. ALTERNATIVE WELFARIAN READING 
Even if one were to read two-sided market theory in a welfarian perspective, the thrust of the 
theory – that the overall “price level” is not the sole determinant of output – is an old economic 
idea.  The conventionality of this finding is best illustrated by price discrimination theory.  
Much like price allocation in two-sided markets, charging differentiated prices to consumers 
can increase output and promote efficiency.31  Third-degree price discrimination by movie 
theaters is a case in point.32  Movie theaters increase output when they apply different prices to 
parents and children.  Arguably, price discrimination also seeks to “get all users on board”.  
This view, however, is not universally accepted.  Parker and Van Alstyne, for example, have 
disputed the analogy between price discrimination and two-sided markets.  They note that third 
degree price discrimination differentially extracts surplus from consumers and transfers it to 
the seller.  Instead, in two-sided markets, they posit that surplus is transferred from a seller – 
on one side of a platform – to consumers on the other side, potentially increasing consumer 
                                                 
28
 Id. at 649.  In other words, there must be transaction costs preventing “the bilateral setting 
of prices between buyer and seller”. 
 
29
 See section II.B.1 (which concerns the various definitions given to two-sided markets). 
 
30
 Armstrong, supra note 20, at 668-70. 
 
31
 William J. Baumol & David F. Bradford, Optimal Departures From Marginal Cost Pricing, 
6 AM. ECON. REV., Issue 3, 265, 267 (1970). 
 
32
 Barak Orbach & Linar Einav, Uniform prices for differentiated goods: The case of the movie-
theater industry, 27 INT'L REV. L. & ECON., 129, 129–153 (2007). 
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demand and generating extra surplus on the seller side.33  That argument, however, is not 
compelling.  In many two-sided markets, no surplus is transferred from a seller to a user, but 
instead wealth is being asymmetrically distributed across distinct categories of users (or 
customers), for instance, for cross subsidization purposes.  Night clubs are the best example.  
There are two categories of users (males and females) on each side of the platform, and they 
pay distinct prices.  More generally, when there are “positive indirect network effects”, i.e. when 
both sides bilaterally enjoy additional surplus by virtue of the presence of the other (in payment 
cards, night clubs and video consoles for instance) the sort of unidirectional surplus transfer 
observed by Parker and Van Alstyne does not happen. 
Another objection to the analogy might be that in a standard price discrimination setting, there 
are (at least) two prices.  In contrast, in a typical two-sided markets scenario, there is just one 
price: the money side pays (i.e., advertisers on Google’s search engine), and the subsidy side 
pays nothing (i.e., users of Google’s search engine).  However, it is readily apparent that this 
counterargument is deficient.  First, in real life markets, many two-sided businesses charge 
prices on both sides.  Or put differently, the subsidy side often pays a price to the platform, even 
if it bears less of the platform’s costs than the money side (for instance, ladies in night clubs are 
often charged a discounted entrance fee).  A second – and fatal – weakness of this 
counterargument is that it is overly formalistic.  An alternative reading of a two-sided markets 
where a free service is given on the subsidy side may be that users are paying a hidden, non-
monetary price.  For instance, users of Google’s search engine can be deemed to pay in kind, 
when they read adverts and give away personal data to the other side of the platform. 34 
In making the above points, we just want to recall that economists have long known that cost 
allocation can influence output.  And this finding pervades well beyond IO.  Regulatory 
economics shows for instance that, in industries with common costs, Ramsey pricing expands 
output.  Under Ramsey pricing, the service provider structures prices so that they are inversely 
proportional to users’ price elasticity.35 
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 Geoffrey Parker & Marshall W. Van Alstyne, Two-Sided Network Effects: A Theory of 
Information Product Design, 51 MANAGEMENT SCI., No. 10, 1494, 1497 (2005). 
 
34
 See Giacomo Luchetta, Is the Google Platform a Two-Sided Market? (30 April, 2012) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2048683. 
 
35
 See JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, COMPETITION IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 60 
(2001). 
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Similarly, in the economics of justice, Rawls’ “maximin” principle tolerates differences in price 
allocation, provided they are to the advantage of all (the pie increases) and that the welfare of 
the worst off is as large as feasible (the share of the pie).36  In other words, that firms accept to 
pay more than others in exchange for additional utility/output is mundane economics. 
3. TWO-SIDED MARKETS THEORY AND OTHER IO THEORIES 
Turning from a welfarian to an operational perspective, several important features of two-sided 
markets theories build on other well-known IO concepts.  To begin, the theory of network 
externalities that was formulated in the 1980s provided the main economic intuitions on which 
two-sided markets theory runs (Katz and Shapiro, 1985 and 1986).37  The theory of network 
externalities shows that the individual utility that one user derives from a good may raise with 
the number of other users that consume it.  The canonical example is that of communications 
networks.  Increases to the number of users connected to the network multiply the number of 
connections that can be made on the network exponentially.  This can ultimately increase the 
individual value of the network for each user.  
Seen in this context, the theory of two-sided markets looks again like a derivative – albeit a 
significant one – of the mainstream theory of network externalities, with the twist that two 
distinct user groups are present on opposite sides of a platform.  And the experience of agencies 
seems to corroborate our reading.  Although the theory of two-sided markets was the first to 
formalize these cross-platform externalities, authorities had intuitively identified and 
understood them before the emergence of economic models of two-sided markets.38 
                                                 
 
36
 See Edmund S. Phelps, Taxation of Wage Income for Economic Justice, 87 Q. J. ECON., No. 
3, 331, 331-354 (1973).  See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (though Rawls was 
not speaking, strictly, of pricing structures but rather of the distribution of income and wealth 
in society). 
 
37
 See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 
75 AM. ECON. REV., 424, 424-440 (1985).  See also Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, 
Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities, 94 J. POL. ECON., 822, 822-841 
(1986). 
 
38
 Ordover, supra note 7, at 182.  In that respect, the US Microsoft case contains a particularly 
prescient quote.  For a full discussion of this case and its implications see section III.B.1, in 
particular note 185.  
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But even more fundamentally, the theory of two-sided markets is firmly rooted in Coasian 
economics.  At its heart, the Coase theorem sought to propose “a theory to handle the problem 
of harmful effects” posed by the actions of business firms on others (e.g. the cattle raiser that 
destroys crop on neighboring land).39  In his seminal 1960 paper “The Problem of Social Cost”, 
Coase explained that Government regulation (e.g. tax or regulation) was not the sole and whole 
remedy to such negative externalities.40  He sought to explain that the problem of social cost is 
the problem of “choosing the appropriate social arrangement for dealing with the harmful 
effects”.41  And Coase notoriously found that if property rights are well delimited and there are 
no transaction costs, private bargains between firms can lead to an optimal allocation of 
resources.  
With this background, the early two-sided markets papers explain that the platform’s output 
effect only exists when Coasian bargaining amongst users cannot take place, thereby suggesting 
that two-sided markets only exist in a “non-Coasian” world.42   
But this is an incomplete reading of the research of Ronald Coase.  Interestingly, in section VI 
of his 1960 paper43, Coase envisioned alternatives to government regulation and private 
bargains when the cost of market transactions is high.  As early as 1937, Coase had already 
stated in the Nature of the Firm that vertical integration could be an alternative.  And in his 
1960 paper, he exhorted economists “to study the work of the broker in bringing parties 
together”, as a possible alternative.  Though the reference is subtle, it is clear that Coase had 
foreseen, though in embryonic terms, the role of platforms as a “social arrangement” likely to 
resolve externalities.  The point is that two sided markets are a special version of the private 
ordering mechanisms anticipated by Coase to address transaction cost problems.  Schmalensee 
and Evans say just this when they contend that two-sided markets create value by “solving a 
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 Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON., 1, 1 (1960). 
 
40
 Id. 
 
41
 Coase, supra note 40, at 19.  See also GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 117-22 (4th 
ed. 1987) 
 
42
 See Rochet & Tirole, supra note 21, at 649, (according to Rochet &Tirole a market is not 
two-sided when the Coase theorem applies).  See also Parker & Van Alstyne, supra note 33, at 
1497. 
 
43
 Coase, supra note 39, at 15. 
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coordination – and transaction cost – problem between the groups of customers”.44  To suggest 
that two-sided markets exist in a non-Coasian world might thus be an overstatement.  
This same point was made by Spulber in an undeservedly less famous paper.  Spulber argues 
that the “decentralized coordination” that occurs between each group of users through the 
platform relates to “Ronald Coase’s description of private bargaining as a means of resolving 
the problem of social cost”.45  In Spulbers’ opinion, two-sided markets belong to the world of 
Coasian bargaining, because there is an accumulation of bilateral transactions between seller 
and intermediary, and between intermediary and buyer.  This contradicts Rochet and Tirole’s 
crucial point that two-sided markets do not belong to the world of Coasian bargaining because 
some factors prevent users from reengineering or evading the effects of the price structure 
decided by a platform (as with tax incidence).46   
Both views might not be mutually exclusive though.  Two-sided markets exist because of costs 
that would otherwise prevent parties from concluding direct bilateral transactions.  They are 
thus a Coasian “social arrangement” that solves parties’ inability to conclude “bilateral 
transactions”.  In turn, this social arrangement can lead to a series of Coasian bargains between 
users on each side of the platform, if users re-engineer the platform’s pricing decisions (when 
this is the case, there is no two-sided market).  Clearly, the theory of two-sided markets owes 
much to the work of Ronald Coase. 
B. CONCEPTUAL PROLIFERATION 
Initially, the theory of two-sided markets ambitioned to have a well-defined scope.  Rochet and 
Tirole (as well as other early work) had cautiously underscored the specificities of their analysis 
and the necessity “to circumscribe the scope of a two-sided markets theory”.47  But the 
subsequent development of a vast literature on two-sided markets theory may have achieved 
the exact opposite result.  A manifest symptom of this is the myriad of labels that have been 
                                                 
44
 Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 2 at 7. 
 
45
 Spulber, supra note 21, at 544.  
 
46
 Rochet & Tirole, supra note 21, at 649. 
 
47
 Rochet & Tirole, supra note 21, at 664. 
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tagged on “two-sided markets” 48 in subsequent scholarship, possibly with the intention of better 
capturing the dynamics of those markets: “multi-sided platforms”49, “two-sided networks”50, 
“informational intermediation”51, or “two-sided strategies”52. 
In this section, we attempt to document this expansion under a more itemized perspective.  We 
show first that the scholarship is not united at the definitional level (1).  We then discuss several 
core concepts of two-sided markets theory which have also received heterogeneous 
interpretations and denominations (2).  Last, we use concrete illustrations to show that the 
scholarly effervescence that surrounds the theory of two-sided markets has consequences which 
go beyond semantics.  In particular, the present state of doctrinal proliferation risks misleading 
policy makers and enforcers, leading to unsound applications of the law (3).   
1. DEFINITIONS 
A recurring topic in the sided markets literature concerns the definition of two-sided markets, 
and their differences with one-sided markets.53  Rochet and Tirole explained early that “you 
know it when you see it”-type definitions would be inappropriate.54  And an increasing number 
of papers have sought to propose stepwise methods for the identification of two sided markets55. 
In the scholarship, three types of definitions have been particularly popular.  The first, and the 
narrowest, is the one of Rochet and Tirole: a “market is two-sided if the platform can affect the 
volume of transactions by charging more to one side of the market and reducing the price paid 
                                                 
48
 Rochet & Tirole, supra note 19; Julian Wright, One-Sided Logic in Two-Sided Markets, 3 
REV. NETWORK ECON., Issue 1, 44, 44-64 (2004); Rysman, supra note 4. 
 
49
 Evans and Schmalensee, supra note 2. 
 
50
 Thomas R. Eisenmann, Geoffrey Parker, G. & Marshall W. Van Alstyne, Strategies for Two-
Sided Markets, HARV. BUS.  REV., Oct. 2006.  See also Parker & Van Alstyne, supra note 33. 
 
51
 Caillaud & Jullien, supra note 3. 
 
52
 Rysman, supra note 4. 
 
53
 A notable exception is Rysman, who explains that this question may not be so important.  See 
Rysman, supra note 4, at 127. 
 
54
 Rochet & Tirole, supra note 21, at 645. 
 
55
 Lapo Filistrucchi, Damien Geradin & Eric van Damme, Identifying Two-Sided Markets 
(Tilburg Law School Research Paper, No. 008/2012, 2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2008661. 
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by the other in an equal amount; in other words, the price structure matters, and platforms must 
design it so as to bring both sides on board”56.  It focuses on the price structure.  Interestingly, 
Rochet and Tirole complemented this with a definition of one-sided markets: “The market is 
one-sided if the end-users negotiate away the actual allocation of the burden (i.e., the Coase 
theorem applies); it is also one-sided in the presence of asymmetric information between buyer 
and seller, if the transaction between buyer and seller involves a price determined through 
bargaining or monopoly price-setting, provided that there are no membership externalities”.57 
A second, “less formal” definition has been proposed by Evans and Schmalensee58: “a multi-
sided platform” has “two or more groups of consumers”; “who need each other”; “who cannot 
capture the value of their mutual attraction”; and “rely on a catalyst to facilitate” their 
interaction.  This definition has a managerial savor.  It insists on the transactional remedy 
derived from the platform.  
A third definition considers that there is a two-sided market when there is “some kind [emphasis 
added] of interdependence or externality between groups of agents that are served by an 
intermediary”.59  This strand of the literature mostly pays attention to the existence of an 
“indirect network externality” across a platform.  To our understanding, it is the broadest 
definition that can be encountered in two-sided markets scholarship. 
Selecting the optimal definition for two-sided markets is not a trivial issue.  We may approach 
its importance by contrasting Rochet and Tirole’s definition with the two other definitions.  
Rochet and Tirole restrict two-sided markets to situations where Coasian bargaining between 
both sides of a platform is impossible.  This requirement is absent from the two other 
definitions, but has profound implications.  Let us take the example of two close yet distinct 
businesses, i.e. supermarkets and shopping malls.  The Coasian bargaining requirement leads 
to interesting results.  In the case of supermarkets, suppliers cannot bargain with consumers and 
pass through the platform’s allocation of costs.  This is because, in most cases, it is the 
supermarket (i.e. the platform) that sets the retail price.  Supermarkets are thus two-sided 
                                                 
56
 Rochet & Tirole, supra note 21, at 664. 
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 Id. at 665. 
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 Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 2, at 7. 
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 Rysman, supra note 4, at 126. 
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markets in Rochet and Tirole’s sense.  The same conclusion, however, cannot apply to shopping 
malls even though they are, at least at first glance, a similar business model.  Here, consumers 
and stores can modify the shopping mall’s (i.e. the platform) pricing decisions, by bargaining 
over the retail prices which are set by stores.  Shopping malls are thus one-sided markets under 
Rochet and Tirole’s definition.  However, both supermarkets and shopping malls would be 
treated as two-sided markets under the two other definitions.  Under the second definition, it is 
clear that supermarkets and shopping malls solve a transactional problem between suppliers 
and consumers.  Likewise, under the third definition, supermarkets and shopping malls address 
an indirect network externality: the more brands associated to the platform, the more consumers 
want to join the platform, and vice-versa. 
Moreover, under the Rochet and Tirole definition, parameters that are not readily observable 
play a critical role in identifying a two-sided market.  Take supermarkets again.  Whist they are 
generally a form of two-sided market in our above example, the conclusion changes if there is 
resale price maintenance.  In this variant, the supermarket cannot structure prices, for the 
contract provides that it is the supplier who sets the price that is charged to consumers.  Clauses 
introduced in the distribution contract between a supplier and a supermarket may thus turn a 
two-sided market in a one sided market under Rochet and Tirole’s definition.60  In contrast, 
under the other two definitions, those issues are entirely irrelevant, and supermarkets would 
most probably be qualified as two-sided markets, regardless of such contractual arrangements. 
Beyond contractual restrictions, other factors like a platform’s governance structure, or even 
the legal system may have a decisive impact on the availability of Coasian bargaining between 
users, and affect its one or two-sided nature.  Though they have much intuitive appeal, 
definitions that focus primarily on the intermediation remedy provided by the platform – like 
the second – or that insist on cross-group externalities – like the third – turn a blind eye on such 
features.  In so doing, they might be over inclusive and the cause of errors when introduced into 
antitrust policy (type I).  Conversely, those definitions may discard the existence of a two-sided 
                                                 
60
 Payment cards and “surcharging” offer another example.  “Surcharging” is a merchant’s 
ability to make cardholders pay for the transaction fees that it owes to the payment card platform 
as a result of a payment card being used.  If a platform’s rules forbid surcharging, then it is the 
platform that controls which side will bear most of the platform’s costs and both sides probably 
cannot bargain away this allocation.  Instead, if surcharging is allowed, the party with the most 
bargaining power can shift part or all of the costs to the other party, thus overturning the price 
allocation decided by the platform.  
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market because the cross-group externality is not readily observable, and it is the platform’s 
pricing policy that will generate it endogenously.61  In such cases, the definition will be under-
inclusive, and generate another kind of error (type II).  
This is not to say, however, that definitions that condition a finding of two-sidedness on the 
absence of Coasian bargaining are flawless.  Whilst they seem less prone to type I errors, they 
remain potentially under-inclusive.  For instance, if one takes Rochet and Tirole’s focus on the 
pricing structure literally, then free markets where one side does not pay (e.g., free newspapers 
and more generally advertising markets) ought to be reputed as one sided market, for there is 
no price structure on such markets.  What is more, such definitions generate decisional costs.62  
Under Rochet and Tirole’s definition, it is indeed necessary to gauge the intensity of Coasian 
pass through to determine if the market is two sided.  And as Fillistrucchi et al put it, “the lower 
the pass through, the more important the two sided nature of the market”.63  But there is no 
predefined pass through threshold at which a market vacillates from two-sidedness into one-
sidedness.  Market multi-sidedness is thus a matter of degree.  And the process of deciding if a 
market is two-sided risks being warped by endless discussions and will eventually involve a 
certain arbitrariness.  Surely, this remark does not apply to markets of the “media type”, where 
no transaction takes place between the two sides (advertiser and viewer), and where there is 
presumably no pass through.  However, it remains pertinent for markets of the “payment cards 
type”, where a transaction takes place between the two sides (merchant and shopper).   
Whichever the right definition may be, much work thus remains to be done to elicit a cohesive 
understanding of two-sided markets.  
2. CONCEPTS 
Divergences also appear at a more granular level.  In the literature, there is a tendency to 
abandon classic IO concepts in favor of novel notions.  This can be observed in relation to the 
very notion of a “market” (2.1), but also in relation to those of “supply” and “demand” (2.2).  
Again, the issue is not merely rhetorical.   
2.1 MARKETS 
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In the early literature, papers were rife with references to two-sided “markets”64, at least at title 
level.  As matters stand today, the literature has replaced (or qualified) the “market” concept 
with a pattern of references to other concepts, often encountered in the business and tech 
literatures.  Evans and Schmalensee talk of multi-sided “platform businesses” 65 or “markets 
with two-sided platforms”66.  Parker and Van Alstyne resort to the concept of two-sided 
“networks”.67 
A common thread to those papers is to stress the importance of the platform.  The new wording 
may seek to address the critique that the notion of a two-sided market is tautological, for all 
markets are two-sided as long as there is a buyer and seller68. 
The best wording is unclear in our view, and there are good arguments in support of platform-
type semantics (we actually use platform abundantly in this paper).  However, one line of 
argument strongly cautions against the use of platform language, and militates in favor of the 
traditional IO specification.  The concept of “platform” indeed invites another equally 
tautological inference, i.e. that some sectors/businesses are intrinsically multi-sided.69  After 
all, in plain language, a platform is “a raised level surface”, with several sides: an above and a 
below.  
From an economic perspective, however it is not always true that a platform is necessarily 
multi-sided.  For instance, it is customary to view payment card systems as platforms.  
However, although many payment systems – notably Visa, MasterCard and American Express 
– are set up as two-sided markets, this is not always the case.  Many supermarket chains for 
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 Parker & Van Alstyne, supra note 33. 
 
68
 Ordover supra note 7, at 181. 
 
69
 In plain language, a platform is “a raised level surface”, with several sides: an above and a 
below.  
 
17 
 
instance provide their customers with an in-house payment card system.70  At first blush, such 
card systems are not two-sided markets, because the platform owner does not sit between two 
separate groups of users. 71  In addition, even if supermarkets were to subsidize cards to induce 
adoption by shoppers as in the plain-vanilla two-sided market scenario, supermarkets retain the 
ability to charge shoppers for their use of the store’s payment system through discrete increases 
in retail prices.  In this case, the purchases of other shoppers that do not use cards will contribute 
to the purchases of shoppers that use cards.  However, it seems far-fetched to distinguish 
shoppers on this basis, and to view them as the two distinct sides of the payment platform.  
Under this logic, any investment of a supermarket in favor of a category of shoppers would 
precipitate the exacting conclusion that it is a two-sided platform.   
In addition, from a policy perspective, the random, side-by-side combination of business or tech 
journals’ semantics with classic economics terminology may send the counterproductive signal 
that the theory is not mature.  If the theory is ever to be embedded in antitrust and regulation, it 
is probably advisable to frame it in terms that fit readily with accepted terminology in those 
fields.  
2.2 BUYER/SELLER (OR SUPPLY/DEMAND) 
The literature on two-sided markets is replete with references to “users” or to “groups of users”.  
On a close read, those users refer to the well-known IO concepts of “buyers” and “sellers” (or 
of “supply” and “demand”).  In their papers, Rochet and Tirole as well as others, often alternate 
between those two notions.72 
There are several reasons that plausibly explain authors’ indistinct use of both the IO “buyer-
seller” couple and the “users” concept.  One is that in a significant number of two-sided 
markets, users on one side are bartering with the platform so that there is no monetary transfer 
(for instance, in search engines where users accept to view adds and share their personal data 
in exchange for information).  In-kind payments, freebies and subsidies are hard to fit into the 
buyer-seller dichotomy.  Hence the recourse to the generic concept of a “user”.  Another is that 
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in certain two-sided markets, some groups of users pay a price to the platform whereas others 
do not, so they cannot be considered as buyers (for instance, male and female attendants of a 
nightclub).   
In the scholarship, there seems to be a broad understanding that the use of either terminology 
has at best innocuous consequences, and that all users can a priori be considered buyers and/or 
sellers.73  The user that pays no price in dealing with the platform (or that barters with it), is a 
buyer that receives a “negative price” (a subsidy or a “freebie”) as compared to other buyers on 
other sides who are charged a “positive price”.   
With this background, it is tempting to dismiss as formalistic the relevance of the “buyer-seller” 
v “user” dichotomy.  But, treating those concepts as substitutes could ultimately prove 
misleading.  This is best illustrated with a thought experiment.  If one thinks of the economy as 
a world of “platforms and users”, then a football club looks like a two-sided business because 
it helps bring both sides of users “on board”.74  On the one hand, “marquee” players will drive 
up fan base and viewership.75  On the other hand, a large fan base and viewership will boost the 
attractiveness, in both financial and reputational terms, of clubs to players.  Instead, if one thinks 
of the economy as a world of “firms with buyers and sellers”, then a football club does not look 
like a two-sided platform.  It is a vertically structured organization that transforms inputs 
(players) into products (games and entertainment sold in various forms).  This simple 
illustration aids understanding the sheer necessity to clear up a number of ambiguities that have 
insidiously penetrated the literature on two-sided markets.  As R. Bork once wrote, “wrong 
ideas, repeated often enough, lodge themselves in the culture as well as the law, and they 
proceed to expand according to their inner logic”.76  At this juncture, the time may be ripe for 
rationalization. 
C. ILLUSTRATIONS 
The logical implication of the variance in definitions and concepts used in the literature should 
be observable through divergences in the qualification of real-life markets as two-sided.  This 
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section empirically documents this issue.  Although authors seem to agree on a core list of two-
sided markets, for others there are striking discrepancies (1).  This section reviews several real 
life markets under the above definitions, so as to further assess whether they are conducive to 
distinct qualifications (2). 
1. OVERVIEW OF THE LITERATURE  
By and large, there is a consensus in the literature in relation to a core of markets that can be 
deemed two-sided.  Those are the markets that were initially examined in the seminal two-sided 
markets papers.  They include software (videogame platforms), media (portals, TV and 
newspapers) and payment card systems. 77  Similarly, it is relatively undisputed today that 
matching markets and intermediation services (such as night clubs, social gatherings, etc.) 
constitute two sided markets. 78  
Besides these classic examples, disagreements have been more pronounced.  Summarizing the 
literature, Fillistrucchi et al. explain for instance that the categorization of supermarkets and 
airports as two-sided markets has been debated79.  Our own review of the literature confirms 
the existence of divisions in the scholarship.  Armstrong argues that supermarkets are two-
sided80, whilst Rysman disagrees81.  Similarly, Eisemann et al. consider that retail electricity 
markets are evolving in two-sided markets82, whilst Rochet and Tirole seem to disagree83. 
But the most baffling finding of our literature review is that real-life markets are often 
categorized as multi-sided without any substantiation.  In particular, many papers affirm that a 
given market is two-sided, but provide neither explicit citation of prior art nor proof of 
verification under any of the three seminal definitions.  Instead, papers often make short shrift 
of this issue, with rote reference to the fact the platform must get all sides on board or that there 
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is a cross-platform externality.  In the literature, such showings have been sufficient to presume 
that the following markets are two-sided: expos and trade fairs, standardized tests, real estate 
agencies, airports, stock exchanges, credit rating services, academic publishing, ranking 
websites, conferences, patent pools and industrial standards, etc.84  Perhaps the most perplexing 
example is that given by Rysman, who claims that franchising constitutes a two-sided market.  
In his view, the “franchisor operates a two-sided market in the sense that it attracts consumers 
to its brand and franchisees to operate outlets”.85  This, however, leaves entirely out of account 
the fact that franchising is a transaction market of the “payment type”, where franchisees and 
consumers conclude side deals.  There is therefore a theoretical possibility of a Coasian pass-
through.  And it cannot be discarded in the abstract.  In this case, the characterization of the 
market as two-sided should ultimately rest upon the extent of this pass-through. 
2. ASSESSMENT 
In the table below, we have attempted to draw a list of possible two-sided markets and to apply 
to them the three different definitions of two-sided markets discussed previously. 86  The 
objective of this exercise is not to reach a prescriptive conclusion on whether a given market is 
two-sided, but to show that different definitions of the term have a substantial impact on what 
might be considered as a two-sided market.  Although this is a crude assessment, we expect that 
a more sophisticated analysis would produce similar conclusions. 
 
 Rochet and Tirole (2006) 
(price structure matters 
and inability to negotiate 
away part or all of the 
price allocation (incl. 
absence of a seller 
monopoly) 
Schmalensee and Evans 
(2012) (two or more 
groups of customers; 
need each other; cannot 
capture the value of 
mutual attraction; rely on 
a catalyst) 
Rysman (2009) 
(definition does not 
matter, externality 
between groups of 
agents that are served 
by an intermediary) 
Payment systems Y Y Y 
Video game consoles Y  Y Y 
Operating systems Y Y Y 
Online recruitment N Y Y 
Shopping malls N Y Y 
Academic journals  Y Y Y 
Industrial standards Y Y Y 
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Automobile engines N N Y 
Airports N Y Y 
Supermarkets Y Y Y/N 
Conferences Y Y Y 
Franchising  N Y/N Y 
Collecting societies Y Y  Y 
Highways N N Y 
 
Cells are salmon-colored when the assessment relating to a market’s two-sidedness is made in an authored 
paper.  In non-salmon cells we apply the authors’ definition of two-sided markets, though there is no reference 
to these markets in their paper.  These assessments should be read with caution.  As Rochet and Tirole argue, 
whether or not a market is two-sided depends on a number of fact-specific questions.  For a more detailed 
explanation of our assessment, see Appendix I to this paper. 
 
This crude exercise confirms that distinct definitions give rise to different qualifications.  In 
particular, the exercise suggests that the Rochet and Tirole definition is more restrictive than 
the others.  In that, it disputes the finding of Filistrucchi et al. who consider that the Rochet and 
Tirole definition is “broader” than the “transactional remedy” definition offered by 
Schmalensee and Evans.87  Our table also shows that the second and third definitions are very 
close in terms of how easily markets are reputed to be two sided. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The definitional and conceptual fluctuation of the two-sided markets literature is a normal 
evolution.  It takes root in the testing process inherent in economic research (modification in 
specifications and settings).  It is also influenced by the proclivity of academics to distinguish 
their research from prior art.88  The lack of semantic homogeneity in economic discourse may 
also be an explanatory factor.   
This evolution has a number of paradoxical consequences.  On the one hand, as economists 
keep classifying new types of markets (and re-classifying old ones) as two-sided businesses, 
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the early literature retrospectively gets celebrated as a general “theory”.89  According to the 
Oxford dictionary, a theory is: “a supposition or a system of ideas intended to explain 
something, especially one based on general principles independent of the thing to be 
explained”.  However, when looking at the wider implications of the two-sided market theory, 
it is apparent that they cannot be generalized and that they are often not independent from the 
thing to be explained.  On the other hand, as it embraces an ever open-ended scope, the theory 
loses relevance.  When reduced to the notions of markets with indirect network externalities 
and intermediaries, the theory encompasses a vast number of markets including football clubs, 
MBA or LL.M programs, gasoline powered engines, and franchising.  This may be misguided. 
The early literature insisted on the satisfaction of several restrictive conditions, and in particular 
on the absence of Coasian bargaining and the inability to pass-through the price allocation 
through side payments between end users.  Scholars should not lose sight of this, on pain of 
weakening the theory.  As Tirole himself wrote in his famous IO textbook: “At first sight, even 
a theorist should regret the very high ratio of theory to evidence in a field which is often lacking 
in generality and in which practical implications are so crucial”.90 
III. THE THEORY OF TWO-SIDED MARKETS AND ITS RELEVANCE TO US AND 
EU ANTITRUST POLICY 
The combination of academic enthusiasm and uncertainty surrounding the theory of two-sided 
markets might give rise to a number of challenges and pitfalls for antitrust agencies, regulatory 
authorities and courts.  
In this section, we seek to illustrate this phenomenon by analyzing a sample of US and EU 
competition cases where two-sided markets might have been at play.  Because two-sided market 
cases are rarely labeled as such, the cases have been selected on the basis of the broad definition 
given by Rysman.91  All of the cases exhibit the basic trait of market two-sidedness, i.e. cross-
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platform externalities, although – on the basis of publicly available information – we cannot 
authoritatively affirm that they were genuine two-sided markets.    
In this rough sample, we distinguish between two types of cases.  Part (A) covers cases where 
the theory of two-sided markets was avowedly taken into (some) consideration, whilst part (B) 
covers cases where the theory was not clearly or explicitly taken into account.  The latter part 
covers either cases where authorities were familiar with the theory of two-sided markets but 
deliberately decided to leave it aside; cases where the authorities ignored the existence and 
relevance of the theory for the matter to decide; or cases where the authorities applied the 
theory, but did not say so expressly. 
With this section, our ambition is twofold.  In cases where the theory was applied, we question 
whether authorities drew the right (or wrong) implications from it.  In cases where the theory 
was not applied, we question whether two-sided markets were actually involved and whether a 
two-sided analysis would have brought added value to the resolution of the cases. 
A. CASES WHERE THE THEORY WAS TAKEN INTO (SOME) ACCOUNT 
The difficulties faced by competition authorities when applying the theory of two-sided markets 
can be seen in motion in the First Data Corporation92 and American Express93 cases in the US 
(1) and the Groupement des cartes bancaires94 and MasterCard95 cases in the EU (2).  
All four of these cases concern payment card systems, which are canonical examples of two 
sided markets.  Card systems are generally divided into 3-party and 4-party systems.  In a 3-
party system, a single entity is responsible for the system’s issuing and acquiring activities.  
Issuing refers to the segment where card networks distribute cards to users, while acquiring 
refers to the other side of the platform, where they attempt to get merchants to accept their 
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cards.  American Express is probably the best know 3-party system.  In contrast, a 4-party 
system brings together a number of banks that can operate in both the issuing an acquiring 
segments.  In such systems, cardholder banks (the issuing segment) interact with merchants’ 
banks (the acquiring segment) through payment platforms such as Visa and MasterCard.  The 
ultimate function of the platform is to perform payment transactions between issuing and 
acquiring banks.  In both types of systems, the allocation of the platform’s costs among the 
issuing and acquiring sides of a network can drive card adoption up or down.  In this respect, a 
crucial finding of two-sided markets theory is that it is often optimal to allocate the platform’s 
costs on the acquiring side and to sponsor the issuing side.96  This is done seamlessly in a 3-
party system (the platform can easily adapt the prices it charges to users on both sides).  In a 4-
party system, this is often done by making acquiring banks pay a fee to issuing banks for each 
transaction (this is usually referred to as an interchange fee). 
 
 
 
1. US CASES: FIRST DATA CORPORATION AND AMERICAN EXPRESS 
1.1 FIRST DATA CORPORATION 
One area which has drawn much attention from scholars is that of market definition in two-
sided markets.  On both sides of the Atlantic, a prior to measuring market power consists in 
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defining relevant markets.97  A relevant market comprises all the products (or services) that 
compete as substitutes.  The conventional method for the definition of relevant markets is to 
apply the “SSNIP” test (sometimes referred to as the “hypothetical monopolist” test).98  
Technically speaking, the SSNIP test gauges the cross-price elasticity of demand.  It tests 
whether demand will switch to other products (or services) when a Small but Significant Non-
transitory Increase in Price – typically in the range of 5 to 10% – is applied to the product under 
consideration.  To take a classic example, if demand for Coca-Cola shifts to Pepsi when Coke’s 
price increases by 10%, then there is a relevant market for cola drinks that comprises both Coca-
Cola and Pepsi.  The underlying theoretical question is whether the price rise is profitable 
despite the loss in demand.  If it is profitable, then alternative sources of supply do not constrain 
the “hypothetical monopolist” and the candidate group of products constitutes a relevant market 
of its own.  If it is unprofitable, the products to which demand switches must be deemed to 
constrain the supplier, and to form part of the relevant market. 
A number of authors have argued that in two-sided markets the SSNIP test might require 
significant tweaking.99  In a nutshell, they suspect that the SSNIP test does not correctly capture 
cross-platform externalities.  Losing demand on one side of the market can have an impact on 
the number of users present on the other side, making the platform less profitable.  Those 
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indirect network externalities should be brought into the picture when the SSNIP test is applied 
in two-sided markets.  Such externalities may turn a profitable SSNIP on a single side into an 
unprofitable SSNIP when both sides are taken into account.  
The application of the SSNIP test in two-sided markets was one of the issues raised by the DoJ 
and the parties in the United States v. First Data Corp District Court case.100  The case 
concerned a merger between First Data Corporation and Concord, the owners of two of the 
three biggest PIN debit networks in the United States.  PIN debit is an electronic payment 
method that entitles shoppers to pay merchants with cards, upon entry of a personal 
identification number that authorizes the issuing bank to debit funds from the cardholder’s bank 
account.101  Like credit cards, these networks are a typical example of a two-sided market.  
Shoppers value PIN debit cards that give them access to more merchants, while merchants value 
PIN debit brands that give them access to more customers.102 
United States v. First Data Corp provides a good illustration of the practical intricacies faced 
by authorities when implementing the SSNIP test in two-sided markets.  Four of them are 
particularly noteworthy. 
First, should a single SSNIP test be applied to both sides of the market, or should a separate test 
be applied to each side?103  In the First Data case, the DoJ looked at both sides of PIN networks 
separately and only applied the SSNIP test to the merchant side (it is on this side that 
                                                 
100United States and Plaintiff States v. First Data Corp. and Concord EFS, Inc., No. 
1:03CV02169 (D.D.C., 2003). 
 
101See OECD Policy Roundtables, Two-Sided Markets, 36 (2009), 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/44445730.pdf (referring to the US First Data Corp. 
case). 
 
102
 That being said, PIN debit networks with fewer merchants can attract financial institutions 
through various other means, such as more competitive fees, network reliability and speed.  In 
addition, potential cross-network externalities are mitigated by the fact that most financial 
institutions conclude deals with the main card networks and issue cards that are compatible with 
multiple networks.  On the merchant side, the most important parameter of competition is not 
a PIN network’s size, but the level of its fees.  This suggests that network externalities might 
not be particularly significant, especially from the merchant’s point of view. 
 
103
 In practice, this distinction implies that authorities will either define a single platform market 
or two relevant markets on both sides of the platform.  This issue is akin to that of “relevant 
submarkets”, which was notably addressed in the Brown Shoe case, as early as 1962.  See Brown 
Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). 
 
27 
 
anticompetitive effects were deemed most likely)104.  Whether this was the right decision is 
debatable.  Some economists argue that a single “platform” market should be defined when 
users on both sides of the platform conclude tangible transactions105 (i.e. a financial transfer in 
exchange for a good or service) which is the case of most card networks and not the case of 
most advertising platforms.  In so-called “transaction” markets, losing users on one side will 
equally and automatically affect the other side.106  In non-transaction markets, this relation does 
not necessarily hold true.  For instance, users of a search engine are probably insensitive to a 
loss in advertisers on the other side of the platform. 
Other economists argue that both sides of a platform should be looked at separately.107  They 
contend that a dominant card network might decide to exercise its market power by raising 
prices on a single side of the platform.  It would thus be preferable to apply the SSNIP test 
separately on both sides, in order to identify the competitive constraints that are present on each 
one.  
Choosing one method or the other is not without consequences.  Defining a single platform 
market will normally imply a larger price increase.  Imagine a platform which charges 20€ per 
transaction, split equally between users on both sides (10/10).  A 10% platform SSNIP would 
look at consumer switching when the platform charges a total of 22€ per transaction.  In 
contrast, a single side SSNIP would look at consumer switching when a 10% increase is applied 
to one side.  The total price would thus be 21€.  The literature provides little guidance as to 
which of these two routes is the most appropriate.  What is clear, however, is that larger 
increases generally lead to larger relevant markets, as consumer switching becomes more 
prevalent.  
Second, regardless of the approach followed, authorities will have to decide how to allocate the 
10% price increase among different groups of users.  This is no easy choice.  Returning to our 
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example, the 10% increase can be allocated in a range of different ways (for instance, 12/10; 
11/11; 10/12).  Authorities might assume that because the platform was previously charging 
10€ to both sides, the increase should be spread equally (11/11).  On the other hand, they may 
also decide to change the price allocation.  A hypothetical monopolist platform might thus 
charge 12€ to one side and 10€ to the other.  The pros and cons of each option remain unclear 
and economists disagree on the appropriate method.  Some posit that the hypothetical 
monopolist should be allowed to adjust the price structure108, while others argue it should not109.  
In the First Data case, the DoJ argued that a hypothetical monopolist would raise prices by 5-
10% on the acquiring banks side (and hence to merchants), and held the price to issuing banks 
fixed.110 
Market definition is also complicated when one side receives the platform’s services free of 
charge.  Adjusting our example slightly, a platform may charge the entire 20€ transaction fee 
on one side of the market only.  In such cases, should the SSNIP only be applied to the “money” 
side?  And what if the price increase were also applied, in full or part, to subsidized users?  10% 
or less of zero is still zero.  A symbolic fee might have to be set, but this could have dramatic 
effects.  Imagine if Google were ever to charge users 1cent per search; users would surely flee 
in droves.   
Of course, a possible solution to this logjam is to consider that Google charges an implicit price 
on users, which consists in extracting personal data from them.  But it is unclear how to 
operationally simulate the effects on demand of a “small but significant increase in data 
extraction”.  Similarly, one may consider that Google, as a hypothetical monopolist, will instead 
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degrade the quality of the content offered to its users.  But applying a “small but significant 
decrease in content quality” test would certainly prove a daunting task. 
A third question is how to capture the fact that SSNIP increases can affect demand on both sides 
of a platform?  A price increase will directly decrease demand on the side of the platform where 
it is applied.  However, in two-sided markets, this price increase may also decrease demand on 
the other side of the platform if there are positive network externalities (female and male clients 
in night clubs) and increase demand on the other side if there are negative network externalities 
(advertisement on TV).  In turn, this reduction can further affect the users to whom the price 
was initially applied, and so forth.  The idea that authorities should take these externalities into 
account is relatively uncontroversial.  In United States v. First Data Corp, the DoJ appears to 
have taken those externalities into some account.111  But due to a lack of publicly available 
information, it is unclear how this was done in practice.  And beyond the model of Evans and 
Noel112, the research on this issue remains embryonic.  
A fourth and final question concerns the baseline upon which the SSNIP test is calculated.  
When possible, the SSNIP test should be based on a supplier’s (i.e. the platform, in two-sided 
markets) contribution to the final price.113  For example, in the case of firms that transport gas 
through pipelines, the SSNIP paid by gas purchasers should be based only on the price paid for 
transport, rather than on the basis of the total price which includes gas and transport; in the case 
of supermarkets, the SSNIP should be applied on the basis of a retailer’s’ margins, rather than 
on the basis of the total retail price; and in the case of e-booking services, the SSNIP increase 
should be applied to the commission charged by the platform, instead of the final price charged 
to travelers; etc. 
In real-life cases, this baseline is often difficult to identify.  The First Data case illustrates this 
very well.  Merchants’ banks paid two separate transaction fees to the card network: a switch 
fee and an interchange fee.  The parties to the merger argued that only the switch fee should be 
increased because the interchange fee did not accrue to the PIN debit platform, but was 
                                                 
111
 See Hesse & Soven, supra note 99, at 726. 
 
112
 See Evans & Noel, supra note 98. 
 
113
 See US Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines, S. 4.1.2., Example 8 (August 19, 2010), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/100819hmg.pdf. 
 
30 
 
ultimately transferred to financial institutions.114  They thus contended that a PIN debit 
monopolist would use its market power by increasing the switch fee, not the interchange fee.  
The DoJ countered that the total fee paid by merchant banks was the relevant benchmark 
because merchant demand depended on the sum of these two fees.115  Again, choosing one 
option or the other can have an important impact on the results of a SSNIP.  Notably, the 
interchange fee was much larger than the switch fee.  As a result, the DoJ’s proposed approach 
led to a much larger SSNIP price increase than a 5% to 10% increase in the total switch fees. 
To summarize, most economists agree on the high level idea that the SSNIP test should be 
adjusted in multi-sided environments.  But there is much less consensus on the practicalities of 
SSNIP analysis in such markets.116  In the First Data case, there was a reasonable alternative 
to almost every decision made by the DoJ on the SSNIP test.  There is thus some way to go 
before the SSNIP test can be applied to two-sided markets with any consistency.   
1.2 AMERICAN EXPRESS 
The American Express117 case concerned rules imposed by American Express (hereafter 
“Amex”), one of the largest credit card networks in the US.  The rules (hereafter “NDPs”) 
prevented merchants that deal with Amex from “steering” cardholders towards cheaper card 
networks.  Amex’s NDPs imposed what can be thought of as a rule of card neutrality: if a 
merchant accepts American Express – which might attract shoppers – it cannot then encourage 
shoppers to use a competing card network that charges lower merchant fees.  The plaintiffs (the 
United States and a number of state attorneys general) contended that the NDPs had suppressed 
price competition among card networks for merchants.  They argued that if merchants cannot 
steer shoppers towards competing card networks which charge lower fees, then card networks 
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have no incentive to set merchant fees below the monopoly price.  Amex rejected these claims 
and responded that the NDPs provided a premium user experience to Amex cardholders118 and 
prevented rival card networks from free-riding on Amex’s promotional investments which 
attract cardholders to points of sale.  
Siding with the plaintiffs, the Court considered that, in a world with NDPs, cardholders decide 
which payment card to use without any interference from merchants.  Cardholders hold the key 
and will thus choose a payment method based on their preferences, notably the rewards they 
receive, rather than merchants’ costs.  As a result, card networks have no incentive to offer 
merchants lower fees than their rivals.  The Court argued that this was not just bad for 
merchants, but also for all shoppers that do not use a card, but pay cash119.  This is because 
merchants can pass on those inflated costs to cash shoppers through increased retail prices.  
Cash shoppers thus indirectly pay for card transactions without deriving any benefits from 
them.120 
 The Amex case is mired with references to two-sided markets.  For example, the background 
section of the ruling contains a lengthy introduction to the theory of two-sided markets.  But 
those references were ultimately planted there to set the stage for the case, and nothing more.  
In contrast, the theory played almost no role in the resolution of the case’s thorniest issues.  This 
can be observed at three levels.   
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First, the Court concluded that Amex’s NDPs restricted competition because they removed card 
networks’ incentive to compete on prices121.  In contrast, the two-sided markets literature 
suggests that even when steering is prohibited card networks have strong incentives to offer 
competitive prices to merchants.  Each merchant must weigh the costs and benefits of accepting 
a network’s cards.  In that regard, it is clear that the fees that a payment network charges depend 
heavily on whether it can bring exclusive users to the table.  If the network has no exclusive 
users (i.e. if all its users multi-home), it will have to charge lower fees than its competitors in 
order to be accepted by merchants. 122  In contrast, if the network has only exclusive users, it 
will be able to charge merchants the monopoly price (this is often referred to as a competitive 
bottleneck). 123  Merchant fees will thus reflect the benefits brought by exclusive users and the 
potential losses from multi-homing users (who would otherwise use a card with lower merchant 
fees).  In short, some form of price competition will persist despite the presence of NDPs.  This 
is not to say that NDPs cannot conceivably lead to increased prices, but that their effect on 
prices is much more ambiguous than the Court’s ruling might suggest. 
A second question is whether a restriction of price competition for merchants reduces social 
welfare.  In that regard, the Court simply reported that merchant fees had increased in the period 
that followed the introduction of anti-steering provisions by Amex and other card networks124.  
Even if one were to assume that this increase was caused by Amex’s introduction of NDPs, 
such a finding is in itself insufficient to derive that NDPs are anticompetitive.  As we note 
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further down125, a price increase on one side of a platform can increase overall output.  For 
instance, the higher fees paid by merchants might be outweighed by increased card use, which 
boosts sales.  The “card use externality” theory of harm put forward by the Court is thus only 
one side of the coin.  Clearly, increased merchant fees have the potential to harm consumers, 
including cardholders.  But they also have the potential to promote card use and efficient 
shopping.  Which of these effects dominates invariably hinges upon case-specific assessments.  
In that regard, the Court’s contention126 that the merchant fee increases were only partially 
passed-on to cardholders is insufficient to conclude that output decreased.  Indeed, the two-
sided markets literature does not exclude that an increase to a platform’s price level can be 
offset by changes to its price structure.  
A third question is that of market definition, for the Amex case seems to both follow and depart 
from First Data.  On the one hand, the Amex case is a replay of the First Data single-sided 
SSNIP approach,127 which consisted in increasing the price asymmetrically (i.e. the price paid 
by cardholders was held constant)128 and taking cross-platform feedback effects into account129.  
On the other hand, the Amex Court departed from First Data with regards to the fees upon 
which the SSNIP test was applied.  Unlike in First Data, where the SSNIP was applied to the 
entire fee level paid by merchants, two different SSNIP tests were calculated.  First, a 10% price 
increase was applied solely to the switch fees paid by merchants130.  Second, a 5% increase was 
applied to the entire merchant fees131.  In both cases, the Court found a profitable SSNIP, 
thereby suggesting market power.  Interestingly, the Court also sought to buttress its SSNIP 
analysis with qualitative market information.  
2. EU CASES: GROUPEMENT DES CARTES BANCAIRES AND MASTERCARD 
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2.1 GROUPEMENT DES CARTES BANCAIRES 
In Groupement des cartes bancaires132, a trade association of French banks in charge of a 
payment cards infrastructure had introduced several measures aimed at achieving a certain 
balance between its members’ acquisition and issuance activities.  In particular, the association 
was seeking to prevent some of the member banks from free-riding on others by only operating 
in the issuing segment, which was more lucrative than the acquisition segment.  The association 
had accordingly established a complex fee system which penalized banks with a heavy issuing 
profile or with low acquisition activities.133 
The compatibility of those measures with the law on anticompetitive coordination was brought 
to the attention of the European Commission and the General Court (“GC”, the jurisdiction 
which reviews, in first instance, appeals against the Commission’s decisions).  Much of the case 
hinged upon the alleged multi-sidedness of the card system, and its implications for the antitrust 
analysis.  
Both the Commission and the GC acknowledged the existence of externalities between the 
acquiring and issuing sides of the card system.  However, they then nevertheless took the view 
that the issuing side of the platform was the only relevant market in which competition was to 
be scrutinized.134  Proceeding on this logic, both the Commission and the General Court were 
drawn to the inevitable conclusion that the association’s measures were presumably 
anticompetitive and had to be dealt with under a quasi per se prohibition rule.  This is not 
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surprising.  Looking only at the issuing side of the market, the impugned measures looked like 
garden variety naked restraints. 
When the case reached the Court of Justice (“the Court”) on further appeal, a more holistic 
approach was followed.135  Indeed, the Court found that the General Court had insufficiently 
taken into account of the economic context of the disputed fees.  Instead, the General Court 
should have looked at both sides of the payment system.136  Had it done so, it would have 
realized that the fees sought to achieve a balance between the acquiring and issuing activities 
of the association, and that they were not “by their very nature” harmful to competition.137  In 
turn, the Court suggested that a “rule of reason” approach might have been more appropriate.138 
The Court judgment in Groupement des cartes bancaires was celebrated in the EU antitrust 
community.  Several antitrust scholars and practitioners were prompt to read in it a blueprint 
for the introduction of two-sided markets theory in EU competition law.139  However, any such 
expectations may have been dampened by the concomitant ruling in MasterCard, which was 
handed down the same day (and by the same judges).  
2.2 MASTERCARD 
The Master Card140 case confronted the Court with the next, alternative, question: how to apply 
a “rule of reason” type analysis in two-sided markets?  To ease understanding, the reader will 
recall that in the European context, competition agencies and courts that apply the rule of reason 
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must first review anticompetitive effects under article 101(1) TFEU and then consider 
redeeming pro-competitive justifications under article 101(3) TFEU.  As will be seen below, 
the Court’s approach strays from Groupement des cartes bancaires on both counts. 
MasterCard was about the interchange fees levied by banks that participated to the MasterCard 
payment system.  To summarize, once a card payment is processed in a merchant’s store, the 
MasterCard system requires the acquiring bank (the merchant’s bank) to pay a fee (normally 
smaller than the transaction fee) to the issuing bank (the cardholder’s bank).  This is called an 
interchange fee.  As previously explained, this allows issuing banks to subsidize the use of cards 
by consumers.   
In MasterCard, both the Commission and the General Court had displayed concern that 
MasterCard – which operated as a trade association – was unlawfully “fixing” these multilateral 
interchange fees (hereafter, “MIFs”).  The theory of harm advanced in support of the case was 
that since the multilateral fees served as a basis for the calculation of the charges imposed by 
acquiring banks on merchants (hereafter, “MSCs”), any coordination on their setting risked 
inflating merchants’ costs. 
On final appeal, the Court of Justice confirmed the Commission’s and the GC’s theory of 
anticompetitive effects.141  Like the General Court142, it underscored the adverse distributional 
effect of the MIFs.  In the Court’s view, the MIFs were problematic because they reduced “the 
possibility of prices [for merchants] dropping below a certain threshold”.143  By imposing a 
higher fee on the acquiring banks, the MIFs inflated the base for the calculation of the MSC 
subsequently charged by acquiring banks to merchants.144  With this, the mechanism placed a 
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lower limit on the MSC that in turn led to a transfer of surplus from merchants to acquiring 
banks.145 
In contrast, the Court made short shrift of the MIFs’ potential output effects, which is the terrain 
where two-sided markets theory has arguably the most to offer to antitrust analysis.  Nowhere 
does the judgment consider whether the MIFs led to a reduction in card payments.  Neither does 
the judgment discuss whether shifting costs from one side (issuers) of the market to the other 
(acquirers) could increase output on all sides of the market.146 
The judgment’s lack of interest in output issues is all the more remarkable, given the 
contemporaneous judgment in Groupement des cartes bancaires.  In the case of payment 
systems, any antitrust observer would have instinctively expected the Court to consider the 
MIFs’ output effects.  But framing the case in output terms would have brought to the antitrust 
debate a boatload of additional complexities.  The Court may thus have been reluctant to expend 
more resources into the resolution of what could otherwise be framed as a clear-cut horizontal 
coordination case.  
The complex implications of a two-sided markets analysis can be best understood with a short 
numerical example.  Let us imagine two different states of the world: one where merchant fees 
are inflated by MIFs, and another where there are no MIFs.  We could further imagine that in a 
world with MIFs, merchants pay MSCs of 2€ per transaction and consumers nothing, whereas 
in a world without MIFs both merchants and consumers pay 1€ per transaction.  If their demand 
is highly elastic, consumers will use their cards far less often when they are charged 1€.  One 
could thus imagine a situation where 500 consumers are willing to use their card for 0€ and 
where 100 consumers are willing to use their cards for 1€.  At the other end of the platform, 
merchant’s demand for card transactions is less elastic: 500 merchants are willing to conclude 
transactions at 2€ per transaction and only 600 merchants might be willing to conclude 
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transactions at 1€.  Assuming that both merchants and consumers only conclude a single 
transaction, the two states of the world give the following results.  In a world with shared fees 
(no MIFs), 600 merchants would like to conclude card transactions, but only 100 have that 
possibility.  In short, merchants are rationed: in this world there are simply not enough 
consumers to satisfy the merchants (and cover their investments into cards systems).  Only 100 
card transactions are made.  In the second world, 600 merchants are willing to conclude card 
transactions, as are 500 consumers.  As a result, there are 500 card transactions.  Compared to 
the first state of the world, it is true that 100 merchants have each lost 1€ in consumer surplus.  
But on the other hand, 400 extra merchants and 400 extra consumers can now conclude card 
transactions.  
In this hypothetical example, merchants are better off paying more because they are no longer 
rationed147.  Increased MIFs may thus lead to Pareto improvements.  This, in turn, would 
militate in favor of a regime of antitrust exoneration.  
But this will not always be the case.  For a start, higher MIFs do not necessarily increase a 
payment system’s output.  For example, the extra sums paid by merchants might be absorbed 
by the card payment platform and/or only marginally transferred to the issuing side.  Moreover, 
consumers’ elasticity might not be as high as in our example.  Even if it is passed on to 
consumers, a higher MIF might not increase output if the demand of consumers demand is less 
elastic than that of merchants.  Furthermore, platforms can also charge merchants well beyond 
the point where consumers’ adoption of the platform is increased.148  Last, empirical literature 
suggests that interchange fees and their suppression have little effect on consumer welfare.149 
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More importantly, as discussed previously in relation to the Amex case, MIFs may impose 
negative externalities on cash shoppers.  This occurs due to the combination of merchant fees 
and of the no-surcharge rule which is commonly applied in the payment system industry.  Under 
the no-surcharge rule, merchants must charge the same price to all customers regardless of their 
payment method.  With this background, merchants may thus have incentives to pass on the 
cost of the merchant fee to all shoppers indistinctly, through increased retail prices.  Both card 
and cash shoppers will thus bear the costs generated by card payments.150  Moreover, the MIFs 
may generate an even higher adverse effect on cash shoppers, because cardholders are often 
subsidized by the issuing bank.  The latter may thus bear less of the card system’s costs than 
cash shoppers, though the magnitude of this effect remains ambiguous.  
Finally, a number of economists have proposed151 to introduce a so-called “tourist test” to 
determine whether the level of interchange fees is excessive152.  The “tourist test” asks whether, 
given the choice, a merchant would choose to turn down a payment card in favor of cash 
payments.  To pass the test, the net benefits from a card payment, for the merchant, musk exceed 
the level of the merchant fee.  Despite all its merits, the test remains an imperfect proxy.  It 
notably assumes that the relevant consumers are able and willing to pay with cash, which is a 
crude assumption.  It also ignores the fact that accepting a card can draw consumers to the 
merchant shop and boost sales.  Last, it discounts potential negative externalities that stem from 
cash payments, such as tax fraud.153 
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No matter, none of those nuanced considerations trickled into the MasterCard judgment.  The 
Court turned a blind eye to two-sided markets theory.  It concluded that the MIFs exerted 
anticompetitive effects on microscopic distributional grounds, by finding that merchants were 
harmed through inflated costs.  Perhaps, one reason for the Court’s disinterest is that it is – 
understandably – reluctant to make comparisons across diverse groups of users.  After all, why 
favor some economic agents on one side – cardholders – at the expense of economic agents on 
the other side – merchants?  However, this fails to capture that the positive effects of MIFs 
might ultimately revert back to the same group of users that was allegedly harmed, i.e. 
merchants, through an increase in the overall number of card transactions, and in turn an 
expansion of total economic output (it has indeed been suggested that the use of payment cards 
can have a positive impact on overall spending154).  In short, the Court failed to grasp that MIFs 
might potentially be used to subsidize card adoption and translate into more card transactions 
for merchants and shoppers alike.  Although this virtuous effect is far from certain, one might 
regret that is was not more central to the ruling.  
At some junctures of the judgment, however, the two sided markets theory is given some 
currency.  In particular, the review of the pro-competitive justifications advanced by the parties 
led the Court to discuss the efficiency benefits of MIFs.  In their appeals, the parties argued that 
the MIFs fulfilled the first condition set out at Article 101(3) TFEU which talks of “improving 
the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress”.155  In 
their view, this was the case because the MIFs sponsored card adoption and thus benefited to 
cardholders.156  The Court took a different tack.  It held that when customers on both sides of a 
two-sided market are not substantially the same, at least some of the benefits that stem from 
anticompetitive conduct must accrue to those within the relevant market.157  Accordingly, 
because the relevant market was the acquiring side of the platform, some of the MIFs’ benefits 
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had to fall upon merchants and not just upon cardholders.  The Court in turn observed that the 
parties had not challenged the General Court’s conclusion that merchants did not benefit from 
the MIFs.158  This was therefore the end of the story.159  As has already been mentioned, 
however, it is not a logical imperative that higher prices necessarily harm merchants.  With this 
in mind, one can only wonder what might have happened if the parties had argued that 
merchants benefited from the MIFs through increased output. 
3. SUMMATION 
So far, our case review triggers the following observations.  First, the sophisticated antitrust 
reader will, by now, have seen that the problems that are central to these cases are not specific 
to two-sided markets theory, and might have been approached under classic antitrust doctrine.  
Take Groupement des cartes bancaires.  The gist of the case was that some banks were free 
riding on others: whilst the payment system required members to invest in the costly acquisition 
segment, most banks only wanted to enter the lucrative issuing segment of the market.  Such 
free-riding (or cream-skimming) dynamics are not peculiar to payment systems and can be 
encountered in many industries, including for instance in distribution networks where 
opportunistic retailers attempt to free ride on before and after-sales investments made by others.  
And for decades, antitrust law has dealt with free rider issues in contractual relationships.  With 
this background, the added value of the detour by two sided markets theory is unclear.   
Likewise, Amex seems to owe intellectually as much to behavioral economics – which are not 
mentioned once in the ruling – as it does to two-sided markets theory – which gets a whole host 
of references.160  After all, by allowing merchants to steer cardholders, the Court hoped that 
cardholders could be nudged into using less expensive networks, even though these networks 
might have offered them lower cardholder rewards.   
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Second, both the US and EU cases illustrate how multi-sided markets restore the welfare 
tradeoffs debate.  As many economists have noted, in two-sided markets there are at least two 
components to look at: the platform’s total output and the surplus that accrues to parties on both 
sides of the platform.161  The upshot is that authorities will often be called to choose between 
total welfare and consumer welfare.  Though this is an age-old conundrum,162 the growing 
ubiquity of two-sided markets makes the discussion on welfare tradeoffs even more acute 
(especially if only on side’s consumer surplus is taken into account).  
For the moment, the EU and US cases display no clear policy trend on the welfare tradeoffs.  In 
Groupement des cartes bancaires, the Court appears to have favored platform output.  Indeed, 
as the Court itself accepted in Groupement des Cartes bancaires, the fee system undoubtedly 
reduced the surplus of some members of the association on the issuing side of the market.163  
However, despite this adverse distributional effect, the Groupement des Cartes bancaires Court 
insisted that the measures at stake aimed at fostering investments on the acquisition side of the 
market.  In contrast, in MasterCard, the Court leaned towards a consumer welfare standard.  
The MasterCard Court did not require any proof that the MIFs restricted platform output.  It 
simply considered one side of the platform, holding that a price increase on one side of a 
platform was sufficient to prove anticompetitive effects.164  This schism is unfortunate.  By 
favoring different objectives in Groupement des cartes bancaires and MasterCard, the Court 
seems unable to articulate a clear vision of the goals of competition policy.  Things do not seem 
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considerably clearer on the other side of the Atlantic.  In Amex, the Court barely mentioned the 
tradeoff between platform output and (one side) consumer surplus.  Granted, the Court referred 
to externalities which might ultimately cause retail prices to increase165.  This suggests that it 
might favor overall output.  That said, the Court also repeatedly insisted on the importance of 
low prices in the acquiring segment (thus ignoring competition for cardholders).  Moreover, it 
did not pay much attention to the NDPs’ effect on overall card use and sales volumes.  Both 
these factors suggest that the Amex Court’s main concern was merchants’ consumer surplus.  
Without a more explicit treatment by the Court, however, one is left guessing. 
In addition, the narrow consumer surplus standards applied in MasterCard and, presumably, in 
Amex significantly reduce the applicability of the theory of two-sided markets to competition 
law.  If a price increase on one side of a platform is systematically found to have anticompetitive 
effects, then the theory of two-sided markets becomes nearly irrelevant for competition law 
purposes.  
To summarize, the four cases that are studied in this section show that the theory of two-sided 
markets has entered US and European case law.  However, in light of the disparities observed 
on each side of the Atlantic, it is at once apparent that this has occurred in the absence of a 
clear, explicit and structured framework.166  Much remains to be done to properly embed two-
sided market theory in antitrust policy. 
B. CASES WHERE THE THEORY WAS NOT (CLEARLY) TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT 
Two-sided markets were most certainly present well before economists discovered and 
theorized them.  If this is the case, the literature suggests that, without the benefit of theories of 
two-sided markets, authorities and courts may have committed decisional errors whilst 
enforcing the antitrust laws.  
In what follows, we focus on two iconic US and EU antitrust cases in the areas of coordinated 
and single firm conduct.  We find that the theory of two-sided markets would probably not have 
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significantly affected the general outcome of these cases and that authorities often used proxies 
or rules of thumb that approximated what is today known as the theory of two-sided markets. 
1. SINGLE FIRM CONDUCT: MICROSOFT IN THE US AND THE EU 
The Microsoft case is one of the most high profile cases in US and European antitrust history. 
In the US,167 the case notably focused on Microsoft’s maintenance of its Windows operating 
system (“OS”) monopoly through the exclusion of middleware developers such as Netscape.168 
The Court of Appeals found that Microsoft had sought to protect its OS monopoly from the 
platform threat posed by middleware providers.  This was achieved through  several tactics, 
such as contractually preventing OEMs from pre-installing rival browsers, integrating Internet 
Explorer and Windows (notably by removing Internet Explorer Add/Remove utility), 
attempting to exclude Java, etc.  Ultimately, the Court of Appeals upheld large parts of the 
District Court’s ruling which found that Microsoft had unlawfully drawn developers away from 
rival platforms that might otherwise have challenged Microsoft’s OS monopoly.  
In Europe, Microsoft was found guilty of excluding rivals from the media player market, 
through the tying of “Windows Media Player” (hereafter: “WMP”) with its dominant OS 
Windows.169  The Commission and the General Court’s theory of abusive tying was that with 
pre-installation of WMP on Windows, Microsoft had made its media player ubiquitous.170  
Content providers and software developers were induced to use WMP-compatible language.171  
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In turn, this made WMP more attractive to users, creating a “positive feedback loop”172 which 
foreclosed rival media players.173 
Given that software markets are often mentioned in two-sided markets papers174, it is worth 
asking (1.1) whether the American and European Microsoft cases feature two-sided markets, 
and (1.2) whether the application of two-sided markets theory could have substantially affected 
their outcome.  
1.1 DID THE US AND EU CASES CONCERN TWO-SIDED MARKETS? 
At first blush, OSs, media players and internet browsers exhibit the basic traits of two-sided 
markets.  The three products sit between end-users and content providers, and there are strong 
indications that the price allocation set by these platforms can, for a given price level, have an 
impact on output.175 
But on closer examination, OS and media players must probably be separated from web 
browsers.  Indeed, OSs and media players exhibit obvious cross-group externalities.  On both 
platforms, users on one side are likely to attach some value to the size and quality of the group 
that is present at the other end of the platform:176  OSs match program and application designers 
with end-users.  And Media players connect users and content providers.177  Moreover, for 
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media players and, maybe less clearly so for OS, users and developers will often be prevented 
from reallocating these platforms’ pricing decisions amongst themselves. 
But in so far as web browsers are concerned, the existence of cross-platform externalities is less 
probable.  Recall that web browsers sit between several different groups of users, i.e. end users, 
web developers, and client side codes178.  With this background, the magnitude of a browser’s 
user base seems indifferent for web developers and vice versa.  This is so for a number of 
reasons.  First, most mainstream browsers are compatible with all mainstream client side 
codes179, users can thus access any website with any browser.  Second, websites do not need to 
be optimized in order to run on specific browsers.  As a result, web developers do not have to 
commit themselves to a particular browser in order to reach out to users.180   
In contrast, the theory of two-sided markets may become relevant in a web browser 
environment, when companies use such software as gateways to other services where cross-
platform externalities might reappear (for example, Google offers its Chrome browser for free 
as a way to encourage consumers to use Google’s other services, including search; Mozilla 
earns money by integrating Google’s search engine as the default search engine181) or as a 
rudimentary OS (this was ultimately the goal of Netscape,182 and was initially how Chrome OS 
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was meant to function)183. In such settings, the two-sidedness of browsers is much clearer.  
However, technicalities aside, the web browser at play in the Microsoft cases did not possess 
the fundamental features of two-sided markets, in contrast with the OSs and media players.  
With this nuanced picture in mind, one might then ask whether the US Court of Appeals and 
EU General Court cases withstand examination under the theory of two-sided markets. 
1.2 COULD THE THEORY OF TWO-SIDED HAVE AFFECTED THE OUTCOME OF THE CASES? 
Both the US and European Microsoft cases predate the emergence of the seminal models of two 
sided markets.184  Despite this, the US and EU decisions are broadly in line with the main 
teachings of the theory, even though they relied on a standard theory of network effects.  Both 
decisions understood that tying-down users on one side of a platform could increase adoption 
by users on the other side.  In other words, the two cases aptly identified the existence of cross-
group externalities.  On this later aspect, the language used by the US Court of Appeals is 
particularly prescient:185  
“Browser usage share is important [authors’ note: here the browser was being used as a 
rudimentary OS] because, as we explained in Section II.A above, a browser (or any middleware 
product, for that matter) must have a critical mass of users in order to attract software 
developers to write applications relying upon the APIs it exposes… The overwhelming majority 
of consumers will only use a PC operating system for which there already exists a large and 
varied set of ... applications, and for which it seems relatively certain that new types of 
applications and new versions of existing applications will continue to be marketed...” 
 
In hindsight, application of the theory of two-sided markets in those cases would only have 
marginally improved the antitrust analysis.  Surely, the two sided markets literature could have 
provided stylized wording to improve the authorities’ formal reasoning.  It might also have 
helped substantiate the idea that Microsoft was seeking to become a gatekeeper on the 
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multimedia content side of the market, though the facts were rather unsupportive of this 
theory.186   
Conversely, the theory could have given ammunition to Microsoft in support of its defense that 
that tying its OS to its web browser and media player was objectively justified.  It has been 
suggested that tying in two-sided markets can be efficient even if it leads to foreclosure.187  
Surely such a finding would not have precluded the Court of Appeals or the Commission from 
affirming liability.  On both sides of the Atlantic, objective justifications and efficiency 
defenses are easily disposed of in single firm conduct cases.  Nevertheless, such arguments 
would surely have complicated the task of the authorities. 
2. COORDINATED CONDUCT: EBOOKS IN THE US AND EU 
The eBooks sector has also been the target of antitrust remedies in the US188 and EU189.  In both 
jurisdictions, antitrust agencies found that Apple and a number of e-Book publishers had 
unlawfully colluded to undermine Amazon’s aggressive pricing strategy. 
The factual background of those cases is complex, and thus deserves a preliminary exposition.  
In 2007, Amazon initiated a $9.99 pricing policy for a number of e-Books sold on its platform.  
Wary that this policy would decimate their margins, e-Book publishers sought to discuss with 
Amazon a change of their business relationship from a classic wholesale model – where 
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Amazon freely set the retail price for e-Books – to an agency model – where publishers would 
set the retail price themselves.  But Amazon refused to migrate to an agency model.   
In parallel to this, Apple was preparing for entry in the retail e-Books business.  E-Books 
publishers thus started discussions with Apple, and it soon became clear that Apple’s entry 
offered a unique opportunity to coerce Amazon into the agency model.  What happened 
subsequently is now well documented in antitrust history.  E-Books publishers signed agency 
agreements with Apple.  The agency agreements contained MFN (most favored nation) 
provisions which tied eBooks publishers’ hands to Apple and threatened to disrupt Amazon’s 
supplies.  In practice, the MFN clause worked as follows: should Amazon continue to sell its 
e-Books at a loss to Amazon for $9.99, all eBooks sold on Apple’s platform would have to 
retail at the same price, with the particular condition that Apple would retain a 30% commission 
on each sale.  Under this contractual arrangement, an e-Book sold to Amazon for $12.99 (and 
retailed at $9.99) would, in effect, have to be “sold” to Apple for $6.99.  
Clearly, any such price would have proved untenable for e-Book publishers.  Anticipating 
dramatic losses, e-Book publishers used this pretext to bring Amazon back to the negotiation 
table and, ultimately, bury the wholesale model for good.  Amazon was left with no other choice 
but to give in to the publisher’s demands or risk being denied access to their e-Books.   
Eventually, antitrust investigations were opened in the US and EU.  With good reason, agencies 
levelled antitrust concern at the coordinated tactics employed by Apple and e-Books publishers 
to foreclose Amazon.  The US District Court for the Southern District of New York affirmed 
liability for horizontal conspiracy under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.  The European 
Commission settled the case with the parties in exchange for demanding remedies. 
Interestingly, both cases were decided on the basis of a single-sided market analysis.  This could 
come as a surprise for e-Books seem to fit squarely within the classic definition of a two-sided 
market.  As observed by Jeff Bezos himself,190 Amazon’s core business consists in bringing 
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together book publishers (in digital format) and readers.191  Moreover, beyond industry 
participants’ testimonies, e-Book platforms exhibit many of the characteristics of two-sided 
markets.  The ability to access a large variety of works is of the utmost importance to readers, 
especially if they must pay for their reading device, which is systematically the case.192  Last, 
it is plausible that an e-Book platform’s pricing structure can, for a given price level, affect 
output. In that respect, recent empirical data adduced by Amazon suggests that consumer 
demand is highly elastic in the eBook sector193, and very slight price reductions might have 
sizeable effects on the demand of eBooks.  
But the greatest pedagogical virtue of the e-Books saga is to illustrate the many difficulties of 
applied two-sided markets theory.  Let us revert to the facts in dispute.  From an economic 
perspective, the impugned agency agreements had the effect of arrogating pricing allocation 
choices from the platform.  The agency agreements thus converted a two-sided market into a 
one-sided market.  But is this, in itself, a source of antitrust concern?  Some elements of 
response may be found in Armstrong’s “competitive bottlenecks” model.  Armstrong suggests 
that in industries like eBooks  the multi-homing side – in this case the publishers – will face 
monopsony prices to serve the exclusive users of each competing platform – in this case the 
readers.194  In turn, the model predicts that the monopsony gains achieved over publishers will 
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 In doing so, they reduce searching and transport costs for consumers, and they allow 
publishers to enjoy enhanced benefits stemming from the long tailed distribution of revenues 
(publishers no longer need to decide how many books should be printed and no longer need to 
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Books Team, http://www.readersunited.com/. 
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 Armstrong, supra note 20, at 677.  Alternatively, one could speculate that Amazon was 
trying to change the price that customers were willing to pay for an eBook and ultimately force 
publishers to adapt their prices.  It is also plausible that part of the loss that Amazon made on 
some eBooks was in part compensated by revenue from other, more profitable, eBook sales, by 
revenue from its Kindle or by advertising revenue.  As far as revenue from its Kindle reading 
device is concerned, see Germain Gaudin & Alexander White, On the Antitrust Economics of 
the Electronic Books Industry 3 (September 24, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2352495.  Gaudin and White who show 
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be transferred to readers, and that a two-sided market setting should thus be particularly 
favorable for consumers.   
Is this, in itself, sufficient to justify concern against agency contracts in multi-sided industries?  
The likely answer is no.  The fact that two-sided “competitive bottlenecks” might yield 
significant welfare benefits does not imply by necessity that one sided markets cannot bring 
equal welfare improvements.  In that regard, Gaudin and White offer a model that compares 
welfare under agency and retail models.195  Their findings are ambiguous.196  In short, the 
welfare consequences of multi-sidedness v. one-sidedness remain poorly understood. 
3. SUMMATION 
To close our review of this second sample of decisions, several cross-case remarks are in order.  
For a start, it cannot be conclusively affirmed that two-sided markets were at stake in all those 
cases.  This is most apparent in the e-Books case, where platforms are probably two-sided 
markets under the wholesale model but not under the agency model.  Here, it is a platform’s 
contractual arrangements that determines whether a market is two-sided.  Likewise, in 
Microsoft, media players and OSs seem to fall neatly within the classic definition of two-sided 
markets, but this is not the case of neighboring products like web browsers.  
More fundamentally, the primary challenge for authorities is not so much one of properly 
ascertaining whether two-sided markets are stake, but rather one of determining if a two-sided 
market analysis is relevant to the outcome of a case.  In that respect, both legal and economic 
institutions can limit the theory’s relevance.  As far as the legal framework is concerned, case-
law constraints on the admissibility of economic evidence or on the formulation of efficiency 
defenses might limit the usefulness of the theory of two-sided markets in real life cases.  
Suppose that Microsoft’s foreclosure of rivals had been deemed efficient by economists, would 
authorities have changed their decisions?  The answer is far from clear.  Conversely, economics 
might often provide ambiguous answers to concrete problems.  Take the e-Books cases.  Gaudin 
                                                 
that eBooks and readers are complementary goods and that their prices should always be looked 
at together.  As far as advertising is concerned, see Amazon’s web page for advertisers 
http://services.amazon.com/content/product-ads-on-
amazon.htm/ref=footer_pads?ld=AZPADSFooter. 
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and White’s model suggests that the benefits of agency versus wholesale models depend on 
whether a retailer (Amazon or Apple in this case) holds a monopoly over a complementary 
good (the e-Book reader).  Wholesale is preferable when the retailer has a device monopoly, 
while Agency is superior when this is not the case.197  This raises vexing questions for 
authorities.  Are Amazon’s Kindle and Apple’s iPad competitors?  If not, do the companies 
have some form of monopoly power over their devices?  Furthermore, Gaudin and White 
assume that publishers are not colluding, which goes against the facts of the e-Books cases.198  
If one assumes that publishers are colluding, then the findings of Gaudin & White’s model no 
longer hold.  On the contrary, agency agreements may be looked at as facilitating devices that 
promote horizontal collusion at publisher level.199 
At this juncture, it should be pointed out that most of the two-sided markets scholarship points 
in the direction of a relaxation of antitrust enforcement (the most obvious example being the 
potential justifications for below cost pricing in two-sided markets).  Not unlike Chicago school 
arguments in their time, the theory is often invoked as a means of defense against antitrust 
theories of harm.  However, this need not be the case.  As has already been mentioned, turning 
a two-sided market into a one-sided market might in some cases be used to remove pricing 
momentum from a platform in order to facilitate a horizontal cartel.  The e-Books decisions 
offer an illustration.  With the conversion of Amazon to an agency model, publishers regained 
control over prices and with it the ability to better detect potential deviations from collusion, be 
it explicit or tacit (the facts suggest that e-Book publishers were reluctant to compete on 
prices200).  The theory of two-sided markets thus also has the potential to help authorities 
understand why a given business conduct might be anticompetitive – something which has 
largely gone unnoticed.201 
                                                 
197
 Id. 
 
198
 Id., at 21. 
 
199
 See Posner, supra note 16, at 88; See also Bruno Jullien & Patrick Rey, Resale Price 
Maintenance and Collusion, 38 Rand J. Econ., Issue 4, 983, 983-1001 (2007). 
 
200
 See Case United States of America v. Apple Inc., U.S. 12 Civ. 2862, 2013. 
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A last remark is that authorities seemed to intuitively grasp the key findings of the theory of 
two-sided markets – such as the importance of cross-platform externalities – even though their 
decisions were not anchored in formal two-sided markets reasoning.  This is abundantly clear 
in the US and EU Microsoft cases.  And this begets the question of whether improved two-sided 
markets models might have brought anything useful to the resolution of such cases, beyond 
raising decisional costs. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The past ten years have seen a surge in two-sided market papers.  A by-product of this evolution 
has been to whittle away the relevance of one of the theory’s basic assumptions – i.e., the 
unavailability of Coasian bargaining.  But this is not all.  The literature today displays a jungle 
of competing two-sided market models.  And just as Jean Tirole once lamented with regards to 
industrial organization as a whole, there is often little to help authorities choose between these 
models. 202  As models become ever more idiosyncratic, the theory of two-sided markets  risks 
leaving both authorities and firms in difficult situations; the former because for every case they 
will have to choose between competing models and the latter because they might be left with 
very little legal certainty.  
These limitations should not, however, discredit the theory’s practical contributions in modern 
antitrust policy.  In a world where multimedia platforms are increasingly ubiquitous, the theory 
of two-sided markets offers a unique framework to understand the dynamics of market 
competition.  In the cases discussed in this paper, the theory often assisted the authorities in 
understanding the concrete supply and demand conditions on both sides of platforms.  The 
theory also encouraged authorities not to apply existing legal tests mechanically to two-sided 
markets – think of the SSNIP test in US First Data and Amex cases, and the Court’s analysis in 
the EU Groupement des cartes bancaires case.  These are positive contributions.  
Despite this, challenges remain.  First, in rule-making contexts, courts and authorities will have 
to draw legal implications from a theory whose policy conclusions are (i) not always consistent 
and (ii) often challenge established antitrust doctrine.  From an economic point of view, there 
is still some disagreement concerning the theory’s finer points (notably what constitutes a two-
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sided market) and how it should be implemented.  In this paper we notably report divergent 
views concerning the implementation of the SSNIP test, the welfare implications of interchange 
fees, the desirability of fragmentation in software markets, the optimal contractual 
arrangements for the distribution of eBooks, etc.  From a legal point of view, the theory 
confronts courts and agencies with the necessity of choosing a welfare standard, so as to solve 
the various trade-offs and distributional choices that will occur in real-life, two-sided markets 
cases.  In the EU, the upper courts have to date refused to ascribe a clear welfarian rationale to 
the competition rules.  Instead, in case after case, they have obscured the question, with abstract 
references to public-interest goals or to the internal market imperative.  How long this 
intellectual charade will continue in the face of the clear welfarian question put forward by two-
sided markets theory is anyone’s guess.  In the US, in contrast, the issue is less acute, because 
courts have not shied away from discussing the welfarian foundations of the antitrust rules.   
Secondly, in adjudication contexts, courts and agencies should identify cases where the theory 
is most relevant.  Sometimes, a two-sided analysis will offer little added value because a case’s 
key issues are not specific to two-sided markets or because one can grasp most of the theory’s 
potential contributions without explicitly referring to it.  As is often the case with antitrust 
decisions, a full-blown two-sided markets analysis risks increasing decisional costs and should 
therefore be used sparingly – that is, only when it is clear that it can bring an important 
contribution to their decision. 
To summarize, although in many cases the theory has a strong explanatory value, it is far from 
cohesive at this stage.  If, as many economists advocate, the theory of two-sided markets is to 
be further implemented by competition authorities, a necessary prerequisite is that it be 
sufficiently streamlined.  Further research is therefore needed in order to better turn theory into 
policy. 
 
* 
* * 
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APPENDIX I: COMPARISON OF POTENTIALLY TWO-SIDED MARKETS 
A. PAYMENT SYSTEMS 
• Rochet and Tirole:  
Page 648.  Yes, if three conditions are met: no surcharging; if platform’s MIF is passed through 
to cardholders and merchants; and if dual-pricing system doesn’t lead to transaction costs. 
• Evans and Schmalensee: 
Implicit in paper that payment systems are two-sided markets; many references to them as 
examples; no mention that they might not be two-sided markets in some circumstances. 
• Rysman:  
Page 126.  Yes. 
B. VIDEO GAMES 
• Rochet and Tirole:  
Page 645.  Yes.  Presumably with similar caveats as in the case of payment systems. For 
example, under an agency model rather than a retail model, video game consoles might not be 
true two-sided markets. 
• Evans and Schmalensee: 
Page 31.  Yes. 
• Rysman: 
Page 125.  Yes 
C. OPERATING SYSTEMS 
• Rochet and Tirole: 
Page 646.  Yes.  Usual caveats apply. 
• Evans and Schmalensee: 
Pages 17 and 32, notably.  Yes. 
• Rysman:  
Page 129.  Yes. 
D. ONLINE RECRUITMENT 
• Rochet and Tirole: 
Not mentioned in paper.  Probably not two-sided; users on both sides of the platform might be 
able to reallocate the platform’s costs among themselves. 
• Evans and Schmalensee: 
Page 15.  Yes. 
• Rysman:  
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Page 127.  Yes. 
E. SHOPPING MALLS 
• Rochet and Tirole: 
Not mentioned in paper.  Maybe not two-sided.  Shoppers and retailers are free to reallocate the 
costs of the platform.  
• Evans and Schmalensee: 
Pages 14 and 15.  Yes. 
• Rysman:  
Page 125.  Yes. 
F. ACADEMIC JOURNALS (AUTHORS AND READERS) 
• Rochet and Tirole: 
Not mentioned in paper.  Probably yes.  Academic journals must choose a pricing structure 
which, presumably, has a strong impact on output.  There do not seem to be any obvious ways 
for parties to bargain around a journal’s price structure.  
• Evans and Schmalensee: 
Page 10.  Yes. 
• Eisenmann, Parker Van Alstyne:  
Page 125.  Yes. 
G. INDUSTRIAL STANDARDS  
• Rochet and Tirole: 
Page 645.Yes, with usual caveats.  
• Evans and Schmalensee: 
Not mentioned in paper.  Probably, standards solve transaction cost problems between 
producers and patent holders.  Both would like to interact, but might not always be able to do 
so absent standards. 
• Rysman:  
Not mentioned in paper.  Unclear.  Buyers value standards which contain the best patents. Patent 
holders might value standards which contain other strong patents (because they are valuable to 
consumers). 
H. AUTOMOBILE ENGINES 
• Rochet and Tirole: 
Not mentioned in paper.  Probably not two-sided markets.  Auto owners and refueling stations 
can reallocate a technology’s pricing structure.  
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• Evans and Schmalensee: 
Not mentioned in paper.  People do not buy engines because they want to interact with refueling 
stations.  This example might be closer to traditional complementary goods situations, where 
the cost of running an engine influences auto owners’ initial investment decisions. 
• Rysman:  
Page 127.  Yes.  Rysman notes that networks could become more relevant to the auto industry 
over the next decade. 
I. AIRPORTS 
• Rochet and Tirole: 
Not mentioned in paper.  Probably not two-sided.  Airlines can and do charge different prices 
depending on the airports of departure and arrival.  This suggests that flyers and airlines often 
reallocate the platform’s costs among themselves. 
• Evans and Schmalensee: 
Not mentioned in paper.  Probably yes.  Flyers and airlines could not interact without airports. 
• Rysman:  
Not mentioned in paper.  Probably yes.  Flyers might value airports that give them access to 
more connecting flights, while airlines might value airports that give them access to more flyers. 
J. SUPERMARKETS 
• Rochet and Tirole: 
Not mentioned in paper.  Maybe yes.  Suppliers and shoppers might not be able to negotiate 
away the platform’s price allocation (if the supermarket controls the retail price).  Non-
neutrality might be highlighted by the fact that, often, some suppliers pay for shelf placement 
while others, which are more valuable to consumers, do not. 
• Evans and Schmalensee: 
Not mentioned in paper.  Yes.  Shoppers and suppliers need each other; shoppers want to buy 
goods, suppliers want to sell them.  Although these transactions could theoretically take place 
directly, outside of shops, such a system might be prohibitively expensive (shops significantly 
reduce transaction costs). 
• Rysman:  
No.  Rysman finds that grocers/supermarkets are not two-sided markets, because suppliers are 
not paid based on the success of the supermarket with consumers (i.e. how many consumers the 
supermarket attracts).  If one were to assume, as we do, that the number of consumers they draw 
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affects the wholesale “price”, then supermarkets would be two-sided under Rysman’s 
definition. 
K. CONFERENCES 
• Rochet and Tirole: 
Not mentioned in paper.  Probably yes.  A conference’s pricing structure might well affect 
output.  Parties cannot readily bargain around the platform’s pricing structure. 
• Evans and Schmalensee: 
Not mentioned in paper.  Yes.  Conference attendees and speakers want to interact but need a 
venue to do so effectively.  
• Rysman:  
Not mentioned in paper.  Yes.  Conference attendees value quality speakers, while speakers 
probably value high profile conferences with many attendees. 
L. FRANCHISING (ABSENT RPM) 
• Rochet and Tirole: 
Not mentioned in paper.  Whether or not a franchise’s price structure affects output might 
depend on whether it controls the prices charged by franchisees. Without RPM, franchisees and 
customers should be able to bargain away the platform’s price structure. 
• Evans and Schmalensee: 
Not mentioned in paper.  Unclear.  Franchisees and customers would like to interact by selling 
and consuming goods, respectively.  It is unclear to what extent they need franchises in order 
to do so. 
• Rysman:  
Page 136.  Yes.  
M. COLLECTING SOCIETIES 
• Rochet and Tirole: 
Not mentioned in paper.  Probably yes.  In many instances, artists and consumers cannot 
reallocate the collecting society’s price structure (especially if exclusive licenses are 
concluded).  The price structure chosen by the collecting society might well affect output 
(parallel with industrial standards and pools). 
• Evans and Schmalensee: 
Not mentioned in paper.  Clients and artists need each other, but could probably not strike deals 
without collecting societies (due to prohibitive transaction costs). 
• Rysman:  
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Not mentioned in paper.  Probably yes.  Artists might value collecting societies that give them 
the widest exposure (i.e. that have deals with the most broadcasters), while broadcasters might 
value collecting societies that have the widest selection of artists. 
N. HIGHWAYS 
• Rochet and Tirole: 
Not mentioned in paper.  Probably not two-sided.  Although highways must make price 
structure decisions (charge vehicles or fuel stations), motorists and fuel stations might be able 
to bargain around these price decisions.  
• Evans and Schmalensee: 
Not mentioned in paper.  Probably not two-sided.  Motorists need petrol stations and fuelling 
stations need motorists.  They do not need highways in order to interact, even it is convenient 
for motorists to have petrol stations on the highway. 
• Rysman:  
Not mentioned in paper.  Maybe yes.  Motorists might, to some extent, value highways that 
have more/better petrol stations.  Petrol stations value highways that have more traffic.  
